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The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, edited by 
Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere. Routledge Press, 
2019. Pp. 424. $ 220 (hardback).
KEVIN TIMPE, Calvin University
As Anca Gheaus argues in the introduction to The Routledge Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Childhood and Children, it’s puzzling that children and child-
hood have been relatively neglected as a philosophical topic. I share this 
puzzlement. Motivation for the silence, Gheaus goes on to argue, “can 
perhaps be explained through the belief that childhood is a state of being 
inferior to adulthood” (1) or that “children’s moral status is clearly infe-
rior to adults” (1). The present handbook was developed, in part, to show 
the importance of sustained reflection on children for a wide range of phil-
osophical tasks. And the volume succeeds nicely in this goal.
As one would expect from a handbook, this volume covers a wide vari-
ety of topics. And as one would likewise expect from a review of a hand-
book, there’s no way to engage with the whole of the volume’s breadth 
in a review of reasonable length. Attention will have to be selective. The 
volume comprises five parts: “Being a Child,” “Childhood and Moral 
Status,” “Parents and Children,” “Children in Society,” and “Children 
and the State.” A number of the chapters focus on ethical issues, includ-
ing Carolyn McLeod and Andrew Botterell’s chapter which explores 
why there’s so much opposition to licensing biological parents when we 
already license adoptive and foster parents. Other topics in ethics include 
David Archard’s chapter on consent, Jonathan Seglow’s chapter on parent 
partiality, and the related issue of filial duties toward parents addressed 
by Diane Jeske. Unsurprisingly, social and political topics are also well 
represented. Numerous chapters focus on issues of both professional and 
cultural interest to Christian philosophers qua Christian philosophers, 
including Albert Atkin’s chapter on childhood and race, Serena Olsaretti’s 
chapter on who in a political community should bear the various costs of 
children, Matthew Clayton’s exploration of political neutrality as it relates 
to childrearing, and Mianna Lotz’s insightful discussion of vulnerability. 
The heavy emphasis on ethical and political issues could be justified by 
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the fact that children are typically more vulnerable than adults in a num-
ber of ways that, according to many Christians, should be taken seriously 
in both our ethics and politics.
But the volume also includes a number of issues in epistemology 
(Fabrice Clément and Melissa Koenig’s chapter on conceptions of child 
knowledge), aesthetics (Jonathan Fineberg’s chapter on the history and 
value of children’s art), and ontology (Daniela Cutas’s chapter on the com-
position of the family, which discusses “family” as a cluster concept, some 
aspects of which are socially constructed). In the remainder of my review, 
I specifically engage only a few of the 36 chapters as representative of the 
volume as a whole. This restriction is in no way intended to suggest that 
the other chapters are less valuable, but is simply required by the limita-
tions of a review.
As described in the introduction, the volume’s stated purpose is to “[intro-
duce] readers to various debates about the nature of childhood, children’s 
moral status and its direct implications, duties owed to children by various 
agents and the ways in which society ought to treat children. Our aim is 
not merely to present the state of the art, but also to draw attention to the 
many issues that are still under-explored and, therefore, to encourage future 
research” (2). The volume unquestionably succeeds with respect to these 
aims. It maps a large terrain of philosophical issues and draws on empir-
ical and theoretical work from other disciplines (e.g., neurological under-
standings of children’s cognition and political rights) as appropriate. Most 
of the chapters go beyond just offering an overview of the debates and also 
advance, even if only modestly, the literatures they engage with. Sometimes 
these positive aspects of the project weren’t as robust as some readers might 
hope, but this is an understandable limitation of such a volume.
Suparna Choudhury and Nancy Ferranti’s chapter on “The Science of 
the Adolescent Brain and Its Cultural Implications” is an instance of the 
volume’s many good interactions with relevant non-philosophical liter-
atures. They summarize current neuroimaging and functional studies 
about how adolescent brains differ from adult brains and how the differ-
ences in structure and functioning can explain decreased executive func-
tioning in children. They also discuss “neuromyths” that emerge from 
problematic attempts to bridge brain science and policy-making, as one 
sometimes finds in educational policy. One factor that contributes to these 
neuromyths is the seductiveness of “the neuroscientific turn” that fails 
to properly “acknowledge the importance of social context and environ-
ment” (37). Careful attention to more recent work in social neuroscience, 
they argue, can help correct this imbalance.
Jennifer Epp and Samantha Brennan’s chapter on childhood sexuality 
exemplifies how broadly some of the individual chapters range. Sexuality, 
they argue, is about far more than just sex acts in general, and certainly 
more than just intercourse:
What else might sexuality encompass? Feelings and emotions including 
love, jealousy, and desire (both romantic and sexual); activities like flirting, 
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dating, hand-holding, and cuddling; curiosity about bodies and sexual 
activities; gender, especially as it affects one’s sense of self as a sexual being 
or one’s behaviors in relationships; sexual and romantic orientation; and 
more (274).
A substantial part of their chapter focuses on sex education. Such an activ-
ity, they argue, has two aims. The first, which often receives the majority 
of attention, is forward-looking, seeking to protect and shape the kinds of 
sexual activities that children will engage in once they’re adults. (While 
they mention a number of criticisms with abstinence-only education, 
I  was surprised that they didn’t mention its documented general inef-
fectiveness.) But the second aim seeks to recognize children as presently 
sexual beings—that is to recognize children as beings whose present exist-
ence includes aspects of sexuality (broadly conceived, as indicated above), 
even if it is developing. Epp and Brennan draw on social theorist Jeffrey 
Weeks’s notion of a “sexual citizen” to argue that sex education can be 
justified not just on the basis of forward-looking concerns, but also on 
the basis of a right to access information about their own present sexual-
ity. Here they argue that curriculum could address how sex, gender, and 
identity are shaped by other social categories, including sex education for 
disabled teens.
Quite a few chapters note that philosophical reflection about humans 
can be skewed insofar as the views in question don’t apply equally well 
to all humans. Lars Lindblom’s chapter on “Childhood and the Metric of 
Justice,” for instance, holds that standard views of agency are problematic 
insofar as they do “not apply to children” (320). By largely leaving children 
aside when engaging in philosophy, we often end up with more limited 
views than we intend—and often without noticing what’s been truncated. 
Anthony Skelton’s chapter on “Children and Well-Being,” for instance, 
begins by noting that consciousness, agency, cognition, comprehension, 
and manipulation of information change radically throughout childhood 
and into adulthood. Aristotle famously claimed that children aren’t able 
to achieve eudaimonia: “a child is not happy . . . [since] happiness requires 
both complete virtue and a complete life” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1100a2–5). 
Skelton argues that the best way to reject this argument is to deny the 
underlying implicit assumption that “there is only one way to fare well” 
(92). As with a number of issues this collection addresses, the philosophi-
cal literature on children’s well-being is underdeveloped. After canvasing 
a number of alternatives including subjective accounts and objective-list 
theories of well-being, Skelton argues for a hybrid view. On his view, to 
oversimplify, children have well-being to the degree that they experience 
the proper subjective attitudes toward the items on the objective list. Well-
being is also central to certain questions about paternalism (Kalle Grill’s 
Chapter 11) and to what Anca Gheaus, in her excellent chapter, calls the 
“question of the content of the right to parent” (159).
Perhaps the most notable gap in the volume is that it lacks a chapter 
focused on the metaphysics of what it is to be a child. Many of the chapters 
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note that the issue of the demarcation is really important for what aspect 
of childhood that they’re considering. Consider, for instance, the following 
passage from David Archard’s discussion of consent, which he describes 
as “power that a person has inasmuch as exercising it expresses her will 
that something normative be the case”:
When an age of consent is spoken of, it is intended to serve as a reliable 
marker of when an individual has developed her cognitive and volitional 
capacities to that point at which she has and may exercise the requisite nor-
mative power. There is of course nothing about the reaching of any age as 
such that effects the change from incompetent to competent person. To claim 
as much would invite a charge of arbitrariness. . . . Rather, conventionally 
marked chronological points serve as rough and ready signs of the progres-
sive acquisition of abilities. (135).
In order to avoid objectionable arbitrariness and issues related to vague-
ness, an explicit engagement with the ontology of childhood would have 
been helpful. Furthermore, it could also be that “being a child” is con-
text-dependent as well; what it means to be a child in regards to education 
(ch. 31), and what it means to be a child in regards to the composition of 
the family (ch. 17) might well be different in important ways.
Such a treatment of the relevant metaphysics would have helped clarify 
some of the other issues. For instance, Patrick Tomlin’s chapter on “The 
Value of Childhood” explores both the instrumental and intrinsic value 
of childhood. But if there’s no hard and fast distinction between child-
hood and adulthood, so that both “being a child” and “being an adult” are 
graduated properties, then the values will perhaps be graduated as well. 
Granted, Tomlin acknowledges the underlying metaphysical issue: “as 
everybody recognizes, ‘childhood’ is in fact an amalgam of several quite 
varied life-stages” (86). And he’s not the only contributor to do so. In her 
chapter on autonomy, Sarah Hannan admits something similar: wherever 
we draw the line between childhood and non-childhood in relation to a 
particular philosophical issue, “it is hard to maintain that those falling on 
either side are different in kind, rather than merely in degree” (116).
Another virtue of the volume is that it can help us recognize that what 
we take to be non-standard cases (which we might, following David 
Shoemaker’s discussion of “marginal agency,” call “marginal cases”) can 
show us something about idealized or typical cases. What can we learn 
about the nature of the good life or flourishing from reflection on facts 
about children (e.g., their dependence, the volatility of their moods)? 
Different items on objective-list theories of well-being might be more or 
less important at different times in a person’s life (86). If we only think 
about well-being in terms of what it looks like in adults, and especially if 
we fail to notice how non-marginalized identities such as being non-dis-
abled impact how we think about what “adult human well-being” is 
supposed to look like, then our views of well-being might be problem-
atic. Skelton’s discussion here illustrates something important about the 
book—that it can serve as a corrective to a certain kind of idealization that 
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affects much philosophy, not just ethical or political philosophy but also 
metaphysics and epistemology.
A number of chapters deal with the intersection of childhood with 
various identities: gender, race, and disability. Religion comes up most in 
Clayton’s chapter on political neutrality. It’s absent in other cases where 
one might think it could come up, such as Gina Schouten’s chapter on 
schooling, which focuses almost exclusively on the aims and methods 
of public education. A few times when religion comes up in the volume, 
it’s treatment was critical (though this isn’t to say unfairly critical), as for 
example Colin Macleod’s discussion of how some religious fundamental-
ists who “falsely claim that LBGTQ persons are, in virtue of their sexual 
orientation, bad parents are themselves responsible for creating a social 
environment that harms children” (171).
In a few of the canvased debates, Christian philosophers (and religious 
individuals more generally) may have particular considerations that 
aren’t fully treated in the volume, such as religious reasons for becom-
ing parents, how to understand parental partiality, or issues related to the 
composition of the family (a topic covered in Daniela Cutas’s chapter). 
But these limitations are, as indicated earlier, inevitable given the nature 
of such a volume. And these omissions can serve as an opportunity for 
Christian philosophers to develop distinctly Christian work on these 
issues in the future.
As someone who’s edited a large handbook/companion before, I’m 
aware that it’s very difficult but incredibly valuable to get the contributors 
to make connections across their respective chapters. On this score, the 
editors have succeeded well.
While The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children 
is neither a work in Christian philosophy nor philosophy of religion, 
there is much in it that Christian philosophers will find engaging. Indeed, 
I  believe the editors have succeeded in putting together an incredibly 
worthwhile volume that has the potential to expand the range of projects 
the Christian philosophical community is collectively engaged in.
God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, by 
John-Mark L. Miravalle. Bloomsbury, 2018. Pp. 192. $114 (hardback).
MARY BETH WILLARD, Weber State University
In God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, 
John-Mark L. Miravalle marshals an unexpected soldier, meinongianism, 
into a series of well-known battles in contemporary analytic theology. 
By meinongianism (and here I follow his usage in eliminating the initial 
capital), Miravalle means the thesis that there are some objects that do 
not exist, but nevertheless possess properties (41). Typical examples of 
non-existent objects for Miravalle include fictional objects like Sherlock 
Holmes, who does not exist, but nevertheless is an object about which 
many true things can be said: Holmes is a detective, solves crimes with 
his (also non-existent) friend Watson, and so forth. The appeal of mei-
nongianism for Miravalle lies less in its putative ability to make sense 
of fictional discourse, and more in the potential of its application to 
a range of philosophically puzzling theological claims, such as “God 
knew about you before you ever existed” (2). Non-existent objects have 
being, but not existence, and if they remain uncreated, they remain 
independent of God. God has knowledge of non-existent objects, and 
as it will turn out, God’s creative power consists in bestowing existence 
on non-existents.
The first two chapters introduce the main competitors to meinongi-
anism regarding the question of non-existents. The first chapter considers 
nominalist accounts, which generally proceed from the assumption that 
sentences about non-existents cannot successfully refer to non-existents to 
the strategy of paraphrasing away apparent references. The second chapter 
concerns realism about fictional objects, focusing mostly on van Inwagen’s 
theory of creatures of fiction (“Existence, Ontological Commitment, and 
Fictional Entities,” in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2003)), accord-
ing to which fictional characters exist due to the creative actions of their 
authors, but that not all sentences about them should be read literally. 
Sherlock Holmes was created in 1889 by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, but it 
is only according to the fiction that he solves crimes. The third chapter 
closes out Part One, and introduces Miravalle’s preferred realism, mei-
nongianism, and defends it.
The arguments presented here will be familiar to anyone who is con-
versant with the growing literature on fictional objects. Each competi-
tor accounts for some intuitions well while struggling with others. The 
advantage of meinongianism lies in its relatively minimal use of para-
phrase and preservation of some commonsense intuition; Miravalle 
makes a fair case for meinongianism as a legitimate but often overlooked 
alternative. The costs lie in separating existence from “to be” and a tre-
mendous population explosion, for those of us with the proverbial taste 
for desert landscapes. I found myself wishing Miravalle had addressed 
the following kind of objection. According to Miravalle, authors do not 
create characters, but merely describe them, discovering them and being 
the first to have ideas about these non-existent objects, which they then 
share in stories. Imagine two authors from different long-lost civiliza-
tions, who independently describe the sun god in identical ways. The 
anthropologists assure us there was no cross-cultural contact. It seems 
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